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Abstract 
This paper reviews evidence on two quite different views of the economic 
effects of the U.S decentralized labor market on employment and wages: (1) the 
view that the decentralized market produces wage flexibility which in turn is 
job-creating; (2) the view that decentralization increased income inequality in 
the 1980s. 
It finds that some aspects of decentralized wage flexibility, notably 
changes in wages by age, have been employment-enhancing while others, changes in 
wages by industry, union status, employer size category, have probably been 
"non-competitive" and thus not helped U.S. employment. It also finds evidence 
of rising inequality in various aspects of economic well-being in the U.S, some 
of which are potentially attributable to labor market factors. 
ι-
Factor Prices, Employment, and Inequality in a Decentralized Labor Market 
If there is one characteristic of the U.S. labor market that distinguishes 
it from the markets of most other developed countries, it is the decentralized 
nature of wage determination. In the U.S., economy-wide union and employer 
federations do not dominate the industrial relations scene, as is the case in 
Scandinavia; national wage patterns are not set by a "shunto" offensive, as in 
Japan,- wages are not affected by the minimum wage and governmental extension 
of collective agreements, as in France: arbitration tribunals play no part in 
wage setting, as in Australia; and the national government only rarely inter-
venes in the market for purposes of influencing wage settlements. Even in the 
sector where wages are set by collective bargaining (a rapidly declining segment 
of the market) local rather than national bargaining is the hallmark of the 
American scene. 
There are two basic views about the performance of the decentralized U.S. 
labor market over the past fifteen or so years. On the one hand, there are 
those who extol the U.S. system as performing well in creating employment 
because the decentralized labor market has produced flexible wages relative to 
other factor prices and significant changes in wages across categories of labor. 
The U.S. experience has led many European analysts in particular to focus 
attention "on labour market flexibility as one explanation of the long-standing 
disparities in employment performance between the main regions in the OECD 
area"1 and to suggest various policies to "free up" the labor market in Europe 
along American lines. The other view, expressed by critical-minded Americans, 
is that the decentralized market has performed poorly for sizeable numbers of 
workers, permitting continued long-term unemployment, declining real wages and 
low productivity growth, and increased income inequality. Changes in the income 
and job structure have led some to claim that the U.S. is "deindustrializing," 
creating low-quality service sector jobs at the expense of traditional manufac-
turing, which, in conjunction with rising income inequality, threatens to erode 
the middle class.2 
What does extant evidence say about these two views of the labor market? 
Has the decentralized U.S. system determined wages in ways that helps create 
employment or in ways that create greater inequality? Has the American labor 
market done a good job in adjusting to changing supply, demand, and tech-
nology? To what extent is the sizeable growth of employment in the U.S. (22 
million additional employed workers from 1973 to 1985) attributable to the 
operation of a decentralized market? Has decentralized wage-setting increased 
inequality and created poorer quality jobs? 
This paper examines these questions with evidence from readily available 
data sources and studies on the performance of the U.S. labor market. It seeks 
to assess the two views just described and to determine where each is right, and 
where each is wrong. 
Section one describes the basic patterns of changes in wages and labor costs 
in the U.S. It compares labor costs to other factor prices and analyses struc-
tures of wages across sectors and demographic groups. Section II evaluates the 
potential contribution of the observed wage changes to employment and 
unemployment. It develops the concepts of "competitive wage flexibility" and 
"non-competitive wage flexibility" to guide these analyses. The main finding is 
that some aspects of flexible wages in the U.S. have contributed to expanding 
employment while others have not. Section III evaluates the controversial 
claims that U.S. labor market flexibility is producing inequality, dein-
dustrialization, and deteriorating job structure with dire potential consequen-
ces for the stability of the middle class. The paper concludes with a summary 
of findings. 
Section I: Wages and Labor Costs in the U.S. 
How have labor compensation and costs changed in the U.S. in the past 
15 years in the aggregate and across sectors and demographic groups? To what 
extent do the changes differ from those in other developed countries? 
In this section I examine these fundamental questions with wage and earnings 
data from national establishment surveys, the Current Population Survey, and 
some more limited data sets. I consider first changes in wages in the 
aggregate, then turn to changes in the structure of wages across sectoral and 
demographic groups. 
1.1 Aggregate Changes 
Possibly the most important fact about the pattern of change in U.S. labor 
compensation in the past fifteen years has been the near constancy in real ear-
nings over the period— a relatively unique development in the history of the 
country. Table 1.1 documents this fact using several different compensation 
series based on surveys of both employers (lines 1-2) and individuals (lines 
3-4) and three deflators, the Consumer Price Index, the Wholesale Price Index, 
and the implicit GNP deflator. There are three striking findings in the table. 
First, while the pattern of change in real wages differs moderately 
depending on the wage series, the deflator and the time period covered, in 
every case real wages grow at much less than the 2^-3% per annum rate that has 
characterized the past.3 
Second, and less widely recognized, is the striking divergence between the 
deflators from 1973 to 1980 and 1980 to 1985. In part because of the way in 
which the CPI treated interest on mortgages prior to 1983 the CPI increases more 
rapidly than the WPI deflator in the 1980s so that CPI-deflated wages show a 
much slower growth of real wages than WPI-deflated wages. Indeed, the 
WPI-deflated series show sizeable real wage increases in the 1980-85 period, of 
a magnitude close to longterm historical rates. As for the implicit 
GNP-deflator real wage series, it shows yet a different pattern, as the GNP 
deflator falls relative to the CPI from 1973 to 1980 and remains steady 
thereafter. Because of the different patterns of change in the real wage 
series, which series one chooses is important in evaluating the contribution of 
wage changes to employment changes. In particular, if the WPI is taken as the 
best indicator of the prices relevant to employment decisions, one cannot 
attribute 1980-85 growth of employment to stable or declining real wages in the 
U.S., as is commonly done, because the WPI-deflated series shows increases in that 
period. 
Third, there are differences between the wage series based on source of 
information and definition. The largest increases in wages are for real 
compensation per hour, which includes fringes and social security; the next 
largest is for hourly earnings; both reported by employers; the two series 
reported by individuals show the smallest increases (greatest decreases). 
The near-constancy in real wages in the U.S. can be contrasted to the pat-
tern of real wage growth in other OECD countries (see figure l.i which treats 
manufacturing) which has led some to suggest that in the aggregate the U.S. has 
been more flexible in real wage setting in the face of sluggish economic con-
ditions than other major industrial countries. While this is a reasonable 
interpretation of the evidence on the entire period, some analyses of real wages 
over shorter periods do not show much responsiveness to economic conditions. In 
an analysis of quarterly and of annual real wages in the U.S., Ashenfelter, and 
Ashenfelter & Card, among others, show that holding fixed for differential trends 
over longer periods, real wages moved randomly, suggesting little if any 
flexibility with respect to conditions in the short run. In addition, comparisons 
of changes in wages to changes in shipment by Medoff and Fay show that sizeable 
changes in shipments in U.S. industry have had only modest effects on wages. An 
evaluation of aggregate wage flexibility requires that one contrast the 
Table 1.1 Indexes of Real Wages in the U.S., 1970-1985, (1977=100) 
1970 
1.Index of Adjusted Hourly 
Earnings, Private 
Nonagriculturai, deflated by: 
Consumer Price Index(CPI): 95.7 
Wholesale Price Index(WPI)■100.8 
Implicit GNP Deflator(IGNP) 98.4 
2.Index of Real 
Compensation Per Hour 
Business Sector3· deflated 
(CPI) 
(WPI) 
(IGNP) 
3.Index of Annual 
Income, Full-Time 
Year Round Male 
Workers, deflated by: 
(CPI) 
(WPI) 
(IGNP) 
1973 
101.1 
10b. 1 
100.7 
1980 1985 
9 3 . 5 
9 3 . 5 
9 9 . 9 
9 4 . 3 
1 0 3 . 4 
1 0 0 . 9 
1973-85 
-6.4 
-1.7 
0.2 
1980-85 
0.9 
10.6 
1.0 
b y : 
9 0 . 1 
9 4 . 9 
9 2 . 6 
9 6 . 7 
1 0 0 . 5 
9 6 . 3 
9 6 . 7 
9 6 . 7 
1 0 3 . 3 
9 8 . 3 
1 0 7 . 8 
1 0 5 . 1 
1 .7 
7 . 3 
9 . 1 
1 .7 
1 1 . 5 
2 . 8 
9 5 . 1 
1 0 0 . 2 
9 7 . 7 
1 0 3 . 8 
1 0 7 . 9 
1 0 3 . 4 
9 3 . 6 
9 3 . 6 
1 0 0 . 0 
9 2 . 9 
9 9 . 3 
9 9 . 4 
- 1 0 . 5 
- 8 . 0 
- 3 . 9 
- 0 . 3 
6 . 1 
- 0 . 6 
4.Index of Usual Weekly 
Earnings Full-time Wage and Salary 
Workers, deflated by: 
(CPI) 
(WPI) 
(IGNP) 
9 5 . 7 
1 0 0 . 8 
9 8 . 4 
1 0 1 . 7 
1 0 5 . 7 
1 0 1 . 3 
9 2 . 3 
9 2 . 3 
9 8 . 6 
9 2 . 3 b 
1 0 1 . 2 
9 8 . 7 
- 9 . 2 
- 4 . 3 
- 2 . 6 
0 . 0 
9 . 6 
0 . 1 
5.Index of WPI to CPI 94.9 96.2 100.0 91.2 
6.Index of GNP deflator 
to CPI 97.3 100.4 93.6 93.5 
•5.2 
-6.9 
-8.8 
-0.1 
a Includes Contributions for Social Security and Private Pensions 
b 1986, quarter 1 
Source: Economic Report of the President, February 1986, table B-43 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and Earnings, various 
edit ions. 
Handbook of Labor Statistics, December 1980; December 1983. 
U.S. Bureau of the Commerce, Consumer Population Reports, Series P-60. 
performance of wages(other prices) over different time periods in conjunction with 
the aggregate shocks to which the market is subject, not in isolation. 
1.2 Nominal Wages 
In table 1.2 I turn to the pattern of change in nominal labor costs as 
measured by the private sector "employment cost index" of the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics for union and nonunion workers. The table reveals two aspects of 
"flexible wages" in the U.S. First, it shows that union wages, after out-
distancing nonunion wages in the 1970s, have experienced a significant relative 
decline in their rate of growth in the 1980s, presumably part-and parcel of the 
widely heralded concession movement. During the 1970s union wage contracts, 
many with COLA clauses, tended to maintain or raise real wages while nonunion 
wages fell in real terms. In the 1980s, the union advantage has been declining 
to more traditional levels. Second, and of greater import to the aggregate eco-
nomy, is the remarkably sizeable deceleration in both sectors in the '80s, which 
has revived interest in "Phillips-Curve" type relations, which make nominal wage 
changes a function of unemployment or other measures of the labor market as well 
as of the rate of change of prices. 
1.3 Fringe Benefits 
Labor compensation in the U.S. consists of three distinct components: wages 
and salaries; privately determined fringes; and publicly determined fringes, 
including social security payroll taxes. For years the fringe costs, both pri-
vately determined and publicly determined, have risen more rapidly than have 
wages.Table 1.3 examines how fringe benefits have changed in the period under 
study. While three of the four fringe benefit measures presented in the table 
show a rising share of fringes through 1984, the Chamber of Commerce series, 
which deals with the nation's large leading companies, shows for the first time 
a decline in the share, suggesting that perhaps the rapid increase in the fringe 
ratio in the U.S. will be levelling off in the future. Certainly, both manage-
ment and labor negotiators are aware of and are seeking to reduce the growth of 
fringes. Finally, line 4 of the table shows moderate increases in the payroll 
tax from 1970 to 1983. In 1983 employee-employer payroll taxes accounted for 
13.4% of payrolls in the U.S., up from 9.6% in 1970. 
How does the U.S. compare to Europe in fringe shares of compensation? Table 
1.4 contrasts the U.S. structure of compensation with that in Europe. It 
shows that the fringe share of compensation in the U.S. (and Canada and the UK) 
has historically been lower compared to fringe shares in Europe. 
1.4 Relative Factor Prices 
For the purposes of understanding employment, wages must be examined rela-
tive to the prices of other inputs. After all, firms choose technologies, and 
moke employment, capital, and material wage decisions on the basis of relative 
factor prices. 
Table 1.5 presents several indicators of the change in employment cost 
relative to the costs of their inputs. If labor costs fell relative to capital 
costs or to material costs, one would presumably expect some of the employment 
increase in the U.S. to be due to the aggregate "flexibility" of wages compared 
to other factor costs. In fact, the table shows that from 1975 to 1985 labor 
costs rose less rapidly than did materials costs but more rapidly than the cost 
of finished capital equipment. 
How does the U.S. experience compare to that of other OECD countries? Fig-
ULii L.2 gives the results of a recent OECD analysis. In the OECD calculations, 
with 1973 as the base year, the U.S. and Canada are found to have declining 
relative pnce of labor compared to Europe. Note, however, that if one takes 
Fiyun; i.i: Changes 1n Real Hourly Compensation U.S. vs. Europe 
1970-83 
Manufac tu r ing , 
10.7 
TJ7S7 
36.7 
Canãcfa 
83.1 
BëTgium uenmark France Germany 
76.4 
TTaTy" 
_J 
60.6 
Japan 
56.8 
Nethen ands 
38.4 
Sweden 
54.3 
UK 
Source: S t a t i s t i c a l Abst ract of the United S t a t e s , 1985, p.853. 
Note: Real hour ly compensation excludes employer pay ro l l costs not paid to 
workers . 
Table J. 2: Annual Percentage Change in Employment Cost Index by Union Status 
Union Nonunion 
1973a 
1974a 
1975a 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Wage Developments, various issues, 
for Employment Cost Index and Collective Bargaining Settlements data. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook of Labor Statistics, 1980 bulletin 
2070, table 130 for Production Workers in Manufacturing Affected by Wage 
Decisions. 
a estimated from changes in major contract settlements. 
5 . 7 
7 . 5 
8 . 6 
8 . 1 
7 . 6 
8 . 0 
9 . 0 
1 0 . 9 
9 . 6 
6 . 5 
4 . 6 
3 . 4 
3 . 6 
5 . 5 
8 . 0 
6 . 0 
6 . 8 
6 . 6 
7 . 6 
8 . 5 
8 . 0 
8 . 0 
6 . 1 
5 . 2 
4 . 5 
5 . 1 
1 0 . 3 
1 2 . 6 
1 3 . 4 
1 6 . 4 
1 5 . 2 
1 8 . 6 
1 6 . 9 
2 0 . 2 
T.,blo 1.3: "Fringe Benefii" Costs as a Share of Compensation in the U.S., 1970­65 
1970 1975 1960 1984 
1.National Income 
and Product Accounts 
suppléments/compensât ion 
all industry 
Private manufacturing 
2.ULS, estimated 
"addi τ ional compensât ion"/ 
in manufacturing ­ 24. 26. 27. 
3.Chamber of Commerce 
Survey of Large Firms, all fringes 35.4 3V.1 36.6 
government required fringes 8.0 8.9 9.6 
4. Covered Employer­ (1983) 
Employee Payroll fan 9.6 11.7 12.3 13.4 
Source: line 1 U.S. Department of Commerce, Nat ional Tnronu­ and Product 
Accounts. 
line 2 U.S. Department of Labor 
line 3 U.S. Chamber c f Commerce, lsB4 Employee Benefits. 
line 4 Ta« Foundation, Facts an<i Figures on Government Finance. 
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Table 1.5: Indexes of Nonwage Labor Costs v. No: labor Costs in the U.S., 1975-85 
(indexes 1975=100) 
1975 1980 1983 1985 
1. Employment 
Cost Index(wages) 100 148 180 200 
2.Price of Intermediate 
Materials, Supplies, and 
Components 
Energy 
100 
100 
158 
220 
174 
246 
177 
240 
3.Crude Materials for 
Future Processing Energy 100 220 296 281 
4.Finished Capital 
Equipment 100 148 177 185 
Source: line 1, Bureau of Labor Statistics 
lines 2-4, Economic Report of the President 1984 
l ü 
FIGURE 1 . 2 
RELATIVE PRICE OF LABOUR IN THE SIX MAJOR OECD COUNTRIES(a) 
1970-1982 (1975=100) 
Japan 
United 
Kingdom 
ranee 
/Germany 
Canada 
itcd Slates 
71 72 73 74 75 76 78 79 80 81 
s. Data of compensation of employees in the private sector divided by index of 
user cojt of capital ("rental price of capital") 
Source: OECD Working Paper No. 24, Labour Market Flexibility and External Price Shocks 
L. Klau and A. Mittelstadt, September 1985. 
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1975 as the base, the U.S. experience no longer looks especially good. The 
U.K. and Canada have much more rapid declines in relative cost of labor than the 
U.S. post-1975. Also, note that if one takes 1970 as the base, the U.S. also no 
longer looks like a place where labor/capital costs are declining relative to 
costs elsewhere. The timing of comparisons is thus important for any claims that 
the U.S. has diverged from other countries in relative factor prices, making it 
difficult to sustain strongly the notion that the U.S. employment expansion, 
which was fairly steady over the entire period, can be attributed largely to 
factor prices changes. 
1.5 Productivity, Unit Labor Costs, and Exchange Rates 
Has the modest rise of money labor costs in recent years reduced unit labor 
costs in the U.S., and improved the U.S.'s ability to compete with foreign 
countries? 
The answer to these questions depends on how the change in money compensation 
compares to productivity (unit labor costs= compensation/productivity) and, in 
the international context, to how unit labor costs change relative to such costs 
elsewhere and to changes in exchange rates. 
Table 1.6 presents data on productivity, unit labor costs, and exchange rates 
for the U.S. and other major OECO countries. The top part of the table gives 
compound annual changes for 1980-84. The bottom part provides historic 
background for 1970-1980. A minus in the relative contribution of a factor to 
relative unit labor costs implies that the U.S. did relatively poorly in that 
factor; a plus implies that tne U.S. did better than the other country. Note 
first that from 1970-80 and 1980-84 the productivity figures show that the U.S. 
has had an exceptionally poor performance in measured productivity growth. As a 
consequence the relatively moderate wage growth did not translate into a 
relatively better unit labor cost picture for the U.S., in contrast to major 
competitors either historically, or in the 1980s. Moreover, from an inter-
national competitive perspective, exchange rate fluctuations have dominated unit 
labor cost changes, producing rising prices relative to competitors through late 
1986, when the value of the dollar began to fall. Note, moreover, that there 
are marked differences in the relative contribution of the exchange rate, pro-
ductivity, and labor costs to the worsened U.S. position. The exchange rate was 
only a minor factor in the worsening unit labor costs of the U.S. versus Japan 
but it was the dominant factor in U.S. relative unit labor costs versus Europe. 
1.6 Wage Gaps 
In the Bruno-Sachs analysis of the labor market under stagflation, the 
key variable is labor's share of output. When changes in real wages exceed 
changes in productivity, causing labor's share to rise, their analysis suggest 
a "real wage" problem causing unemployment.cible 1.7 presents readily 
available Bruno-Sachs evidence on wage gaps for the U.S. and other 0ECD 
countries. It shows that the sluggish growth of real wages and productivity 
in the U.S. have produced only a modest rise in labor's share of output, in 
contrast to increases in labor's share in several European countries. Note, 
however, that the U.S had a greater increase in the wage gap than did Canada 
while at the same time having a better unemployment record. Also, Japan- for 
which data are not reported- had one of the largest increases in wage gaps, 
but one of the best unemployment records. While huge increases in real wages 
versus productivity are harmful to employment, as Bruno-Sachs argue, other 
factors are also important. 
A key issue in evaluating the real wages, productivity, and employment 
experience of the U.S. and other countries concerns the causal linkages among 
these variables. One interpretation is that real wage growth is exogeneous, 
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Taille 1.6: Manufacturing Labor Costs (in U.S. dollars) for 11 Countries 
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T a b l e l . 7 : Adjusted Wage Cops, 12 OECD C o u n t r i e s , 1965-1983 
(1964-69 ■ 0 .0 ) 
U.S. 
Canada 
Europe 
U.K. 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
Norway 
Sweden 
1965 
0.2 
-1.9 
-2.0 
2.1 
-2.3 
0.0 
2.0 
2.3 
-2.5 
2.7 
1970 
0.1 
1.9 
2.2 
-0.8 
2.5 
-3.4 
1.5 
6.4 
-4.3 
-1.1 
1973 
6.0 
-0.5 
4.6 
13.6 
8.1 
-0.4 
7.2 
15.4 
-1.3 
-5.2 
1976 
2.9 
3.3 
11.0 
30.2 
13.0 
7.9 
13.0 
19.5 
13.9 
3-7 
1979 
6.8 
0.8 
16.4 
37.2 
17.6 
10.7 
15.3 
11.8 
17.3 
-1.6 
1981 
8.1 
2.2 
24.1 
40.7 
16.4 
14.3 
19.1 
9.1 
7.7 
-4.0 
1982 
8.6 
2.9 
25.0 
35.2 
13.7 
17.4 
15.9 
7.6 
6.4 
-7.1 
1983 
8.4 
3.5 
26.4 
-
9.2 
-
12.9 
5.9 
6.2 
-9.6 
Source: Jeffrey Sachs "High Unemployment in Europe: Diagnosis and Policy Implications," 
NBER Working Paper No. 1830. 
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reducing expansion of employment and inducing productivity growth along a 
demand for labor curve. Another interpretation is that productivity growth is 
exogenous, determining the other variables; yet another is that output growth 
is exogenous, presenting countries with a productivity growth-employment growth 
tradeoff. In section II I will examine these alternative interpretations. 
Whichever interpretation one takes, however, it is important to recognize that 
the sluggish growth of real wages in the U.S. has occurred in conjunction with 
sluggish productivity growth. 
1.7 Wage Structures 
Concerns on the one hand that rigid wages across sectors may impede 
employment growth, and, on the other hand, that changes in wage structures are 
contributing to inequality, have spurred interest in the otherwise neglected 
topic of wage structures, defined as wage differentials among groups of workers, 
classified by employer (industry, size of firm, union status, etc.) and employee 
{occupation, demographic, education, etc.) characteristics. Governmental inter-
ventions in wage-setting to reduce discriminatory differences in the U.S. and 
other countries and its potential consequences for employment and inequality 
have also been at the center of much debate. In this section I examine the pat-
terns of change in wage structures, differentiating where necessary between 
changes due to structural factors and those due to cyclical factors. 
1.8 Employer Characteristics 
The three principal dimensions along which wages differ among employers are 
industry, size of firm, and union status. One of the most striking changes in 
wage structures in the U.S. in recent years has been a sizeable rise in 
differentials along all three dimensions. 
Data based on employer surveys and from the Census of Population show a 
marked rise in inequality of wages across industries, defined either broadly or 
narrowly. For example, in 1970 U.S. manufacturing paid 37% more than retail 
trade; in 1985 the differential had risen to 59%; while within manufacturing the 
ratio of pay between the high-wage petroleum and coal products and low-wage 
apparel rose from 2.02(1970) to 2.50(1985). Taking all industries together, 
figure 3 shows the overall pattern of change in inter-industry differentials, as 
measured by the variance of log earnings. Regressions of the variance on cycli-
cal indicators show that while industry wages widened in the past because of the 
weak labor market of the seventies the rise in inequality shown in the figure is 
not a normal cyclical phenomenon.4 
Comparisons of the U.S. with other countries show that the rise in differen-
tials across industry is for the most part an American phenomenon (see Bell and 
Freeman, OECD). As studies of international differences in inter-industry wage 
structures have found that the U.S. has historically had greater inequality than 
other countries, the recent developments have increased international 
differences, making the U.S. more than ever the outlier in terms of inequality 
of wages among industries. 
Turning to the union premium, virtually all analysts of union wage effects 
have found a rise in the union wage advantage in the 1970's. A rough generali-
zation would be that the 10-15% premium of the 1950s and 1960s rose by ten 
points to 20-25% by the end of the 1970s. In the 1980s, by contrast, concession 
bargaining brought about a noticeable drop in the premium, according to data on 
wage settlements given in table 1.2. However, the primary source of data on union 
and nonunion workers within industries, the Current Population Survey, does not 
show such a pattern, making it difficult to determine if the concessions involve 
declines in the union premium within sectors or a decline in the wages for union 
and nonunion workers in highly organized sectors.5 
FIGURE 1.3: Standard deviation In In of Noiiml Wage (from Bell and Freeman) 
0.32 -
0,22 H 
Ui 
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Pay differentials by size of firm also increased markedly during the 1970s 
period, as can be seen in figure 1.4.Considerable effort has been directed to 
explaining the level of firm differentials in terms of worker characteristics 
and productivity but as yet the only explanation of the change is in terms of 
'union threat' effects, according to which large firms tend to match union pay 
in order to discourage organization of their workers. 
Finally, turning to occupational differentials, the evidence in table 1.8 
tells a remarkable story about patterns of change in occupational earnings. In 
the three separate surveys for which data are available- the May CPS; the 
Employment Cost Index, and the March CPS— the figures show that in the 1980s 
white collar, especially professional, workers have enjoyed much greater wage 
increases than have blue collar workers, especially the lower skilled 
(laborers). The weekly earnings figures show the greatest differential change, 
while the Employment Cost Index shows the least. All of the data sets, however, 
indicate that-for whatever reason- the wage structure shifted in favor of white 
collar skilled labor-a sharp break from historic patterns. 
1.9 Personal Differentials 
There have been striking changes in the structure of wages among American 
workers by age, sex, race, and education. 
Almost alone among the major developed countries, the U.S. has responded to 
the "baby boom" generation's appearance on the labor market by reducing the 
relative pay of young workers (see table 1.9). In 1970, before the baby boom, men 
aged 45-54 earned 73% more than men aged 25-34. By 1984 they earned 123% more 
(panel B, line 1). It is, I argue in section II, no coincidence that the youth 
unemployment problem of the U.S. has peen less severe than in countries where 
the ratio of adult to youth wages has remained constant or decreased. 
Table 9 also shows changes in rates of pay by race and sex, with lower 
paid blacks enjoying increases relative to whites through 1980 but apparently 
experiencing a significant drop in relative earnings in the 1980s, particularly 
in 1984-85. This is a striking indication of retrogression which, if 
confirmed with more detailed analysis, suggests that the weak labor market of 
the '80s or reduced governmental pressures for Equal Employment and 
Affirmative Action have begun to cut into the post-1964 gains of blacks. For 
women, by contrast, the figures show rough stability in wages relative to men 
through 1980 and marked increases thereafter. 
With respect to education, the U.S. (and other developed countries) 
experienced a sizeable drop in the premium paid educated workers through the 
late 1970s - a phenomenon atributable largely to the expansion of the educa-
tional system and the graduation of educated baby boomers into the job market. 
In the 1980s there has been a marked turnaround in the differentials in the 
U.S., with more educated workers enjoying greater wage increases than less edu-
cated workers. 
1.10 Summary 
In sum, the data on wage structures shows considerable changes in relative 
pay in the U.S.. The pay of some groups has risen (fallen) sharply relative to 
that of others, indicating that indeed the wage-setting process in the U.S. is 
quite flexible among groups of workers. Whether this "flexibility" has contri-
buted to employment expansion, however, remains to be seen. 
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Table J..8¡ Changa« In Maga*, by Occupation 
Profaaslona1 
Managerial 
Clarice! 
Oparatlva 
Crafts 
Laborars 
Service 
White Collar 
Managers 
Professionals 
Clerical 
Blue Collar 
Craft 
Operative 
Laborers 
Service 
1970 
IBI 
190 
109 
πβ· 
167 
110 
BT 
•6.2 
•7.6 
•4.6 
•4.4 
•2.6 
•3.4 
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FIGURE 1.4J Estimates of the Effect of Log Number of Employees Per Establishment 
on Log Wages 
1967 
All Industry 
1980 
Manufacturing 
Source: Nicole Garris "Secular and Cyclic Variability of the Firm Size-wage 
Differential" (Harvard College, March 1985), p.30, p.37. 
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Table 1.9: Changes in the Structure of Wages by Personal Characteristics 
A. Median Usual Weekly Earni nos 
1967 1970 I960 1985 (3) 
1. Age 
Males, 25V16-24 1.35 1.43 1.62 1.90 
Females. 25+/16-24 1.07 1.09 1.25 1.44 
2. Race 
Males, bl/wht .69 .72 .77 .73 
Females, bl/wht .80 .85 .92 .86 
3. Sex 
Females/Males .62 .62 .63 .69 
B. Income of Year (found fu, 11 -Time Workers 
1970 1980 1984 
l.Age 
Males, 45-54/20-24 1.73 1.92 2.23 
45-54/25-34 1.18 1.33 1.38 
Females, 45-54/20-24 1.20 1.36 1.44 
 
 
 
1.00 
(1964) 
.63 
.75 
 
 
 
1.01 
" 
.75 
.91 
Females, 45-54/25-34 3.05 
2.Race 
Males, bl and other/wht  .69c 
Females, bl and other/wht  .89 
3. Sex 
Female/Males .57 .59 .63 
4.Education 
College 4 yrs./high school, all 
Male 1.46 1.44 1.46a 
Female 1.46 1.35 1.44a 
College 4 yrs./high school, 25-34 
Male " 1.33 1.21 1.32b 
Female 1.41 1.30 1.37b 
Source: panel A, U.S. Department of Labor 
panel B, U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, 
Consumer Income Series P-60, 1970, 1980, and advance 
1984 reports. 
a Estimated by percentage change in median incomes for groups, 
1983-84. 
b 1983. 
c 1383 value was .76, which implies large single year decline. 
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Section II: Relation of Wage and other Factor Price Changes to Employment 
Have the changes in wages and other factor prices affected employaient? Have 
they produced more jobs than would otherwise be found? More low-quality jobs? 
These are difficult questions to answer, particularly in the aggregate where 
any answer must depend on the macroeconomic model in which one imbeds the 
observed changes in wages. In this section I will address the question of the 
linkage between wage changes and employment in reverse order of section I, 
beginning with the more readily tractable problem of relating changes in wage 
structures to changes in employment structures in the U.S. before offering an 
interpretation of the aggregate wage performance. 
To guide the discussion I distinguish between two types of wage 
flexibility: Competitive wage flexibility, defined as changes in wages in 
response to exogenous shifts in supply or demand that facilitate employment in a 
partial equilibrium supply-and-demand framework. This is the type of 
flexibility which persons favoring flexible wages have in mind when they 
advocate greater flexibility·, when wages are competitively flexible, we should 
be able to explain the observed changes in terms of standard supply and demand 
analysis; and Non-competitive wage flexibility in which changes in wages can 
not be attributed to shifts in supply and demand and which thus do not facili-
tate employment changes. One example of non-competitive wage flexibility would 
be a wage increase in a firm in a growing industry that is not needed to 
increase labor supply. Another is a union-induced increase in wages for workers 
already paid above market rates. 
Investigation of the pattern of wage changes across sectors and workers 
suggests that some of the flexibility in wage structure found in Section I has 
contributed to growth of employment while other components have not. 
Specifically, I believe that flexibility by age and potentially by education and 
occupation have facilitated employment growth while flexibility in the union 
wage premium, in the large firm premium, and in interindustry differentials have 
been largely noncompetitive. Because some of the change in wages by sex and 
race is attributable to government equal opportunity and affirmative action 
programs which raise demand as well as cause movement along a demand schedule, 
the extent to which these wage movements are to judged employment-facilitating 
or not is less clear. 
21 
2.1 Instances of Competitive Wage Flexibility 
2.1.1 Age Earnings Differentials 
The U.S. (along with many but not all other developing countries) 
experienced an enormous increase in the percentage of young workers in the work 
force in the 1970s, which created a significant exogenous shift in supply in the 
job market of relatively unprecedented magnitude. All else the same, this 
increase could be expected to reduce the relative wages of young workers in 
accord with competitive market precepts and thus to be employment facilitating. 
Does research on the determinants of the decline in the relative wages of the 
young in the U.S. support such an interpretation? 
The answer to this question appears to be an unequivocal yes. In a recent 
survey of the literature Bloom and Freeman cite 14 separate studies, all of 
which find a significant impact of the size of the baby boom cohort on earnings. 
Was the wage structure by age flexible enough to absorb all of the new 
workers in sufficient numbers as to preserve youth to adult unemployment rates? 
The evidence here is somewhat more mixed: of five studies examining 
unemployment, Bloom and Freeman cite two as finding little or no effect of 
cohort size on unemployment rates, indicating that the main effect of genera­
tional crowding is on wages and not unemployment, but also cite three that find 
significant effects of cohort size on unemployment. While there is thus some 
disagreement over whether wages adjusted sufficiently to absorb all of the 
increased relative supply of the young, there is no denying the dominant role of 
the wage flexibility in the U.S. response to the rising number of young persons 
in the labor force. By contrast, the relative wages of youths did not decline­
indeed rose­ in several European countries, presumably exacerbating the youth 
unemployment problem in Europe. 
Did the U.S. "absorb" young workers solely into low­wage service jobs, as 
some have suggested? 
To answer this question I have calculated the proportion of young workers, 
by sex, in the workforce of diverse U.S. industries and used the following iden­
tity to decompose the growth of the youth share of employment into three 
components: 
(1) ΔΥ = Ea.AI; + EI ;Aa , + l/M -åa, J j J J J J 
where Y = youth employment 
a: = share of workers in industry j who were young. 
I: - industry employment 
and where échange from 1970 to 1980. 
The three components are: 
\i) GrowLl, ¿m. ι.. c;,­cr.r.:c." :' yo­Jth ^icyment industries,· (Ea^AI ;) 
(2) Growth due to changes in youth intensity of employment within 
industries; (EIjAaj) 
(3) Interaction effects. ΕΔΙ :Aa : 
As car. be seen in table 2.1. youth shares of employment rose in virtually 
every sector, by comparable amounts, indicating that all American industries 
responded to the relatively cheaper youth labor by hiring proportionately more 
young workers. The decomposition shows that all of the rise in the male youth 
share of employment is due to changing youth ­intensity of employment within 
sectors, rather than to any growth of youth intensive industries. A better 
example of a situation in which flexible wages facilitated employment of an 
increased supply of workers across the economy would be hard to find. 
2.1.2 Education and Occupation 
The striking patterns of change in the premium paid educated workers in the 
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Table 2.1: The Proportion of Workers Aged 20 - 29 1n One Digit Industries in the U.S., 
1970 - 1980 
Industry 
Agriculture, 
Forestry, & 
Fisheries 
Mining 
Construction 
Manufacturing 
Transportation, 
Commerce & Other 
Public Utilities 
Wholesale Trade 
Retail Trade 
Finance, Insurance, 
Male 
1970 
.15 
.20 
.22 
.24 
.22 
.22 
.23 
.23 
Workers 
1980 
.25 
.34 
.32 
.27 
.24 
.28 
.30 
.22 
D 
.10 
.14 
.10 
.03 
.02 
.06 
.07 
-.01 
Female 
1970 
.18 
.31 
.23 
.26 
.35 
.27 
.20 
.34 
Workers 
1980 
.25 
.40 
.30 
.30 
.34 -
.33 
.29 
.37 
_p_ 
.07 
.11 
.07 
.04 
.01 
.06 
.09 
.03 
& Real Estate 
Business and 
Repair Services 
.24 30 .06 .30 .34 .04 
Personal Services 
Entertainment, 
Recreation Services 
Professional and 
Related Services 
Public Administration 
Total 
Predicted Change due to 
Industry Mix 
Predicted Change due to 
Youth Intensity 
Interaction 
.18 
.22 
.25 
.18 
.22 
.26 
.33 
.25 
.21 
.28 
.08 
.11 
-
.03 
.06 
.00 
.05 
.01 
.18 
.22 
.28 
.25 
.25 
.23 
.32 
.30 
.30 
.30 
.05 
.10 
.02 
.05 
.05 
.01 
.05 
.01 
Source: U.S. Census of Population, 1970 and 1980. 
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U.S. (and in most developed countries) also appears attributable to flexible 
wage-setting of the competitive form. In this case research shows that the 
increase in the labor supply of more educated workers resulting from the expan-
sion of educational systems in conjunction with the baby boom caused the 
marked decline in the ratio of earnings of more to less educated workers through 
the late 1970s. j n e sharp rise in education premium found in some data 
sets thereafter, however, is somewhat more difficult to explain: one part is 
due to the decreases in the relative supply of new male university graduates,-
another part seems attributable to the lengthy recession of the 1980s, which 
has a greater effect on less educated than more educated labor, another part 
may be due to shifts in demand, and the deindustrialization issues described in 
section III. As yet no definitive analysis of the relative importance of these 
three factors has been made, leaving interpretation of the 1980s rise in educa-
tion premium somewhat unclear. 
With respect to occupation the story is similar: prior to the 1980s rise 
in the premium paid to white-collar and professional workers, changes in the 
occupational wage structure seemed to have been 'competitive'. Teachers wages 
went up in 'shortage' periods and fell as supply increased. The wages of 
scientists and engineers rose following Sputnik and fell as supply increased. 
The recent increase in occupational wage inequality may represent a shift in 
demand and responses to the business cycle, in a similar competitive manner, 
but this has yet to be established. Indeed, the rise in occupational ine-
quality in the 1980s, has, surprisingly, been ignored almost completely in 
debates over U.S. wage flexibility. 
2.2 Uncertain Instances 
The relative earnings of minority and female workers increased in the period 
under study, though with quite different time patterns and rates. Black-to-
white earnings rose among men in the early part of the decade, then levelled 
off, while female-to-male earnings rose at the end of the 1970s-early 1980s. 
While some might be tempted to label the wage changes as noncompetitive, due to 
antibias laws and activities, which made minority and female labor more expen-
sive, such an interpretation would be erroneous, for government policies were 
designed largely to raise demand for these workers. A more plausible reading of 
the evidence is that the policies both raised wages and shifted demand, so that 
the net employment effects of the policies is open to question. With respect to 
blacks, Leonard's direct studies of employment by establishment have found that 
affirmative action has unequivocally raised black employment: Lang and 
Tomashefsky have, however, found that increases in the relative wages of blacks 
across states are positively correlated with increases in unemployment, 
suggesting some tradeoff along a demand curve as well. My analyses and those of 
others relating to the time series show that much of the increase in black-to-
white wages is explicable in terms of increased demand for labor, making the 
changes in wages a competitive form of wage adjustment; on the other hand, there 
is evidence that some of the measured increase in the relative wages for black 
men is associated with declines in their labor participation rate. 
With respect to women, as yet we have no clear analysis of the differential 
impact of the rise in supply {which may or may not have been largely exogenous) 
and of the shift in demand on wages, which leaves us with similar uncertainty. 
In an international context, the relative earnings of women in the U.S. have 
been especially low and have increased less rapidly than elsewhere, while labor 
participation has risen rather sharply, suggesting that any noncompetitive ele-
ment in the wage changes may be small. It is important to recognize in this 
regard that much of female-male pay differences in the U.S. are attributable to 
the concentration of women in low wage service-type industries and to the fact 
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that within industries women tend to be employed in lower wage firms. 
2.3 Instances of Noncompetitive Wage Flexibility 
I come now to three cases where the pattern of changes in relative wages 
appears to be inconsistent with the dictates of a competitive labor market. In 
two of the cases-- the rise in the union premium in the 1970s and the 
corresponding rise in the large-firm premium in that period— there is little 
disagreement about the deleterious impact of the increases on the structure of 
employment. In the third case— that of interindustry differentials— there is 
debate about whether the pattern of rising inequality in the U.S. has or has not 
positively affected employment. 
2.3.1 The Union and Large Firm Premium 
That the successful effort of most American trade unions to maintain or 
increase real wages in the weak labor market of the 1970s had negative effects 
on employment of union workers, and, even more, stimulated employer opposition 
to unionism in the U.S. has been the theme of several recent studies. Table 
2,2 taken from Wachter and Linneman, shows that the vast bulk of the decline in 
the manufacturing share of employment occurred in the union sector and was asso-
ciated with a sizeable increase in the union premium in that area. Indeed, 
Wachter and Linneman interpret their results as indicating that the union wage 
increases operated along labor demand curves, making the change noncompetitive 
flexible by our definition. My analysis of the rise in union wage premium shows 
that it induced additional employer opposition to unions, with resultant dif-
ficulties for unions to organize workers. While there are theoretic models of 
union optimal contracts which predict that changes in union wages and employment 
are "competitive efficient," little evidence has been provided for the relevance 
of this view to the real world. The best paper in the area, by Abowd, showed 
that unexpected union wage increases in the 1970s had little effect on the stock 
market evaluation of firms, indicating that union-wage increases had at most 
minor effects on efficiency at the level of firms. 
Just as the rise in the union premium in the 1970s is likely to have 
reduced union employment, the apparent decline in the premium in the 1980s 
has presumably had a beneficial effect. Indeed, the extent of concessions 
granted by American unions in several sectors in the 1980s suggest that unions-
like their counterparts in Japan- have learned to be more flexible and sensitive 
to the problems of employers. 
Finally, while there is - as noted earlier- no good explanation of the 
rising premium paid workers in large firms (beyond possible union threat 
effects), it is difficult to see how such increases can be competitive. After 
all, pay in large firms was already sufficiently above competitive levels in the 
early 1970s (see Brown and Medoff) as to constitute a genuine wage advantage, 
only moderately less than the union advantage. In any case, as figure 2.1 snows 
the share of employment in large establishments declined notably in the period. 
The concordance of rising wage premium and declining shares of employment in 
large establishments suggest that this is indeed a noncompetitive change in 
wages. 
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Table 2.2: Changes In Employment and Wage Premiums 1973 to 1984 
ι 
Government 
Construction 
Mining 
Manufacturing 
Durables 
Manufacturing 
Nondurables 
Transportation 
Wholesale Trade 
Retail Trade 
F.I.R.E. 
Service 
Cha 
■ hare 
economy 
by 
nge 
of 
em] 
in 
total 
ployment 
sector 
Nonunion 
0.1 
0.2 
0.5 
0.3 
-0.7 
0.9 
0.5 
1.5 
1.5 
2.0 
Union 
0.6 
-1.4 
-0.2 
-4.4 
-2.1 
-0.9 
-0.2 
-0.7 
-0.1 
2.4 
Change In 
union wage 
premium 
-0.4 
-10.1 
15.7 
12.0 
10.9 
13.0 
16.9 
10.0 
1.8 
-2.7 
Change In 
■hare of total 
economy employment 
due to union 
premium change 
0.1 
0.4 
-0.2 
-2.0 
-1.1 
-0.5 
-0.1 
-0.2 
-0.0 
0.1 
Total Economy 6.8 -6.8 1.8 -3.5 
Source: Linneman and Wachter 
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PIGURE 2.1: The Declining Share of Employment in Large Establishments, 1974­1982 
T4Õ 
1974 1982 
Percentage of employment 
in establishments >1000 
workers 
.243 
1974 
7ΠΓ 
1982 
.339 
1974 
104 
1982 
Percentage of Employment in 
Establishments with >500 
workers 
Percentage of 
Establishments>250 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, County Business Patterns, United States 
1974, 1980, and 1982, Table IB. p.3. 
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2.3.2 Interindustry Differentials 
If the rising inequality of wages across industries in the U.S. can be 
explained in terms of competitive factors such as shifts in labor supply to dif-
ferent sectors (greater availability of women workers raising supply to female-
intensive industries, in particular), and changes in demand, we would label the 
flexibility of industry/wages as competitive flexible. Several studies have 
found that changes in industry wages, while affected by competitive factors in 
the expected manner, have also been significantly influenced by changes in value 
productivity across industry lines, which runs counter to the basic principle of 
competitive industry wage determination—namely that changes in industry wages 
should be affected by economy wide factors, not by industry-specific factors 
(Bell and Freeman, OECD). The only possible way in which the observed positive 
correlation between changes in value productivity and changes in wages might be 
attributed to competitive forces would be it productivity changes were positi-
vely associated with employment changes. For the U.S., however, increases in 
productivity are either not correlated or negatively correlated with increases 
in employment, ruling out the demand-shift story. From the perspective of the 
factors that determine wages, therefore, the widening industry differentials 
would appear to be noncompetitive in the period studied. 
As Bell and Freeman point out, however, there is still one possible way in 
which the increased inequality of wages across industries could raise 
employment. This is if employment were more responsive to relative wage decli-
nes than to wage increases, regardless of the reason for the increases. Put 
differently, if elasticities of labor demand were greater in the low wage 
industries which have had below-average incomes in wages than in the high-wage 
industries which have had above-average increases in wages, employment would 
grow as a result of the increase in inequality. Investigation of the relation 
between wage changes and employment changes by sector over the long run show, 
however, no asymmetry of employment responsiveness, implying that American 
industries that had especially small wage increases had employment increases 
comparable to the employment decreases in industries with large wage gains. 
Over the short run, however, the OECD reports some evidence that employment grew 
more in industries with low wage gains than it declined in industries with rapid 
wage gains. Finally, it should be noted that Lawrence and Lawrence offer an 
interpretation of the behavior of some high wage industries in terms of union 
'end game'optimizing behavior, in which unions raise wages in declining 
industries as a form of optimal rent extraction. While this may be the case in 
some sectors, it is clearly not the story of the overall rise in industry wage 
dispersion in the U.S., which has occurred in nonunion as well as union set-
lings, and runs counter to union wage concessions and expressed desires to save 
jobs. 
In sum, the wage flexibility of the U.S. labor market which produced larger-
than-average increases for already highly paid workers in unionized jobs, in 
large firms, and in high-paying industries has, in my reading of the evidence, 
not contributed to employment and is thus best viewed as noncompetitive in terms 
of the dichotomy given at the outset of this section. 
2.4 The Macro-Economic Picture 
Does the U.S. have particularly responsive nominal or real wages? Has real 
wage responsiveness aided U.S. employment? 
Answers to these questions diverge widely. Bruno and Sachs present evi-
dence that the U.S nominal wages tend to respond more slowly to price changes 
than do European nominal wages, which helps increase employment in periods of 
inflation, and that U.S. wages are also more responsive to unemployment than are 
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wages in several European countries. OECD analyses tend to tell a similar 
story, showing the U.S. Canada, and Japan with especially flexible real wages. 
(Klau and Mittelstadt). The contrast between these analyses and those of 
Ashenfelter, Ashenfelter & Card, and Fay & Medoff, which suggest only modest 
nominal and real wage flexibility in the U.S. is striking. Even if we accept, 
however, the claim that U.S wages are more flexible in the short-run, the effect 
of this on overall employment is problematic. One reason is that studies of the 
elasticity of labor demand for the U.S have come up with at most modest 
employment responses, making it difficult to argue that sluggish real wage or 
labor cost changes translate into sizeable changes in employment. A second 
reason is that, given the low productivity growth, real labor cost has not been 
as responsive to economic conditions as have real wages, though the figures in 
table 7 make clear that the U.S has not experienced European style increases in 
wage gaps. 
As the debate over the U.S-Europe employment experience has tended to slight 
the differential productivity experience of the U.S and other OECD countries, it 
will be illuminating at this point to expand on the product ivity-emplovment-
output relations. Accordingly, I summarize in Panel A of table 2.3 evidence on 
measured changes in the three variables for the U.S, OECD Europe, and selected 
countries. Because of possible cross-country differences in measuring service 
sector output, panel Β of the table presents comparable data for manufacturing. 
Taking the GDP data first, note that from 1970 to 1983 real GDP grew at a 
similar rate between the U.S. and OECD Europe, but that productivity in the U.S. 
grew at less than one third the rate in Europe. Had the U.S. had the same GDP 
growth and European productivity growth, the American employment record would 
have looked like the European record. As noted, one interpretation of this is 
that U.S real wages grew only slightly, so that GDP translated into employment 
growth. Another is that, for other reasons, the U.S had poor productivity 
experience, which caused low real wage growth and, given GDP growth, sizeable 
employment expansion. In the more recent recovery from the 1983 depression the 
U.S. does look markedly better than Europe in GDP as well as in employment 
growth, though whether this is a matter of timing of the recovery in the U.S v. 
Europe or is a potentially longer-run phenomenon remains to be seen. 
Turning to manufacturing, the country experiences are more diverse, but 
again the U.S does not enjoy especially large increases in output, and along 
with Canada, experiences exceptionally low productivity growth. Simply 
comparing the range of variation we see that the divergence in hours worked in 
manufacturing is "more" related to the divergences in productivity than to 
divergences in growth of output across countries. 
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Table 2.3: Growth Rates of Real GOP, Employment, and Productivity, 1970-85, and 
of Output and Employment Cost 
A) All Economy 
U.S. 
OECD Europe 
Canada 
Japan 
France 
west Germany 
Italy 
UK 
Belgium 
Sweden 
U.S 
Canada 
Japan 
France 
W. Germany 
Italy 
UK 
Belgium 
Sweden 
Source: 
AGDP 
GDP 
(1) 
37.7 
36.7 
53.6 
78.8 
47.4 
32.0 
34.1 
25.8 
36.6 
24.9 
Δ Output 
Output 
(1) 
34 
35 
112 
46 
19 
39 
-6 
41.' 
13. 
.4 
.4 
.2 
.5 
.5 
.7 
.2 
7 
7 
1970-83 
ΔΕ Δ 
E Productivity 
(2) (l)-(2) 
26.1 
1.5 
30.6 
11.5 
4.1 
-6.6 
5.0 
-3.6 
-2.1 
8.2 
B) 
11.6 
35.2 
23.0 
67.3 
43.3 
38.6 
29.1 
29.4 
38.7 
16.7 
1983-85e 
AGDP ΔΕ Δ 
GDP E Productivity 
(4) (5) (4)-(5) 
8 
4 
9. 
1 
2. 
4. 
4. 
5. 
-
-
.9 
.3 
,6 
.1 
3 
9 
9 
1 
Manufacturing 
Δ Hours 
Hours 
(2) 
-3.1 
-3.2 
-3.3 
-20.7 
-28.4 
-19.7 
-38.6 
-41.6 
-26.8 
0EC0, National Accounts. 
OECD, Employment Outlook. 
Economic Report of the President 1986. 
6.3 
0.0 
4.2 
2.1 
-1.7 
-0.2 
0.8 
2.3 
-
-
2.6 
4.3 
5.4 
9.0 
4.0 
5.1 
4.1 
2.8 
-
-
Δ Output/Hours 
Output/Hours 
39 
40 
119 
84 
66 
73 
60 
138 
55 
.7 
.1 
.6 
.8 
.9 
.9 
.0 
.3 
.5 
U.S. Department of Labor, Output Per Hour, Hourly Compensation, and 
Unit Labor Costs in Manufacturing, Twelve Countries, 1950-1984. 
e estimate«; from CiFTTi 
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Section III: Areas of Labor Market Problems 
The argument that decentralized wage-setting in the U.S. labor market has 
had deleterious effects on economic well-being has focused on three issues: 
(1) rising income inequality and poverty potentially attributable to labor 
market factors, and declines in the size of the middle class; (2) dein-
dustrialization of the American labor force, with a growing dichotomy in the 
kinds of jobs held by workers, some being high paid and skilled and others low 
paid and unskilled; (3) a marked worsening in the relative joblessness 
experience of selected groups in the economy, notably black men, displaced 
workers, and to some extent female heads of households. 
These issues have generated much popular and professional debate. In this 
section I ask if the factual evidence support the claims of economic problems in 
the labor market and what part the flexible labor market has played in exacer-
bating (or reducing) the problems. 
3.1 Rising Income Inequality, Poverty, and the Declining Middle 
There is general agreement, based on CPS annual data, that income inequality 
and poverty have increased in the U.S. Published CPS data summarized in table 
3.1 show no growth in real family income from 1970 to 1984, an increase in the 
index of income concentration (Gini coefficient); and a marked drop in the 
shares of the lower income groups in the income distribution. Analyses of 
the underlying data by Bloom and Blackburn, summarized in table 3.-.2 confirm 
the picture in the official published data: a sizeable increase in income 
inequality in the U.S. in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Perhaps even more disturbing than the evidence of rising inequality in 
incomes among families is evidence that the rise in poverty is concentrated 
among families with children so that an increasing number of children in the 
U.S. are born into poverty. Danzinger and Gottschalk have, in particular, 
found not only a rising trend in inequality and poverty among families with 
children from 1977 to 1984 but a magnitude of change that brings the rate of 
poverty for families with children 30% above levels in 1967!(see table 3.3) 
With respect to the declining middle, some detailed examinations of the 
income distribution tend to show decline in the middle class (Bloom and 
Blackburn, Thurow, Lawrence); while others (Danzinger and Gottshalk) find that 
for the groups they study the increase in the poor is the dominant change in 
the period under consideration; while yet others (Rosenthal, Medoff) find no 
decline in the middle class share of the society. The strongest evidence for a 
declining middle is found in total family income figures, of the type shown in 
figure 3.1where one sees not only an increased proportion of families in the two 
tails but also a noticeable change in the central part of the distribution. 
The biggest differences between the studies that find a declining 
middle-class and those that do not find a declining middle-class is in data used 
for analysis. Declines are generally found in March Current Population Survey 
(CPS) data for family income and annual earnings. Declines are not found in May 
CPS data for weekly earnings overall or by occupation. One possible reason is 
that there are genuine differences between annual income or earnings and weekly 
pay by occupation, due perhaps to patterns of hours worked over the year and 
unemployment. Another is that there are inconsistencies between the March and 
May surveys, for reasons yet to be determined. 
3.1.1 The Role of the Labor iMarket 
The labor market factors that might have altered the distribution of 
income in the period under study are: 
Tcible 3.1: Changes in Income Distribution and Poverty, 1970-1984 
J970 I960 1983 1984 
l.'Real' Median Family Income 26,394 26,500 25,724 26,433 
2.Proport ion of Persons 
Below Poverty Level 12.6 13.0 15.2 14.4 
S.Proportion of Families 
Below Poverty Level 
4. Index of Income Concentration 
5.Shares of Groups in 
lowest fifth 
2nd fifth 
3rd fifth 
4rth fifth 
highest fifth 
Source: Calculated from Economic Report of the President 1986 and from 
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Consumer Income Series, P-60. 
1 0 . 1 
.354 
5 .4 
12 .2 
1 7 . 6 
2 3 . 8 
4 0 . 9 
1 0 . 3 
.365 
5 . 1 
1 1 . 6 
1 7 . 5 
2 4 . 3 
4 1 . 6 
1 2 . 3 
.381 
4 . 7 
1 1 . 1 
1 7 . 1 
2 4 . 4 
4 2 . 7 
1 1 . 6 
.384 
4 . 7 
1 1 . 0 
1 7 . 0 
2 4 . 4 
4 2 . 9 
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Table 3.2 
Inequality Measures, 1963-1982 
Tarlane· of the Log ari t hm of Inc coe (L/ 
12§8 1218 19B2 
total Family Income .7976 .67*2 «970b 
nuiraient Ipcoae .5658 .6561 «820? 
(Aero·· Per·οη·) 
Coefficient of Variation (C) 
Total Family Income .7206 .7309 ·79ΐ6 
Iquiraient Incoa· .683!« -6793 «7l»7l» 
*The population used for these inequality measures is all families with total family 
income above zero but below $138,725 (in 1982 dollars). 
Source: D. Bloom & M. Blackburn, "An Analysis of the Changing American Middle 
Class," Harvard, 1985. 
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Table 3.3 
Incidence of Low Va κ kl j- Earning· of Head« of r a s i l i · · , · 
1967-1984 
B u d · oft 1967 1973 1979 1984 
All Paa l lUa with 
Children 20.8Z 21.SZ 23.81 29.9X 
Whit« 
Black 
Blapanic 
All Two-Parent 
v l t h Children1» 
Whit· 
Black 
Blapanic 
F a m l l l · · 
17.1 
48.3 
Β . · . 
14.3 
12.4 
32.1 
β . · . 
17.7 
45.6 
32.8 
12.7 
11.4 
24.5 
19.2 
19.6 
46.9 
34.6 
14.1 
12.6 
26.6 
22.2 
23.3 
31.5 
44.0 
19.5 
17.7 
32.8 
30.1 
64.8 
83.9 
o .a . 
63.8 
78.4 
81.6 
56.7 
71.7 
75.4 
61.4 
72,7 
79.8 
All Female-Readed 
F a a l l l · · with Children 71.1 68.9 61.9 65.5 
White 
Black 
Hispanic 
•"Low «arner·" ar« family baad« with weekly earnings below $204 per week 
in constant 1984 dol lar« . Such p«r*on· could not earn the poverty-line 
incoa« for · faa l ly of four even i f they worked 52 wecke a year at their 
current weekly wage. 
^Buiband· are c l a s s i f i e d as the beads of two-parent f a a l l l a s . 
Source : Sheldon Danzlger t, P e t e r C o t t s c h a l k , "How Have F a m i l i e s w i th Ch i ld ren 
Been F a r i n g ? " J o i n t Economic Committee, November 1985 
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(1) Increased wage inequality. Using March CPS data, Harrison, Bluestone, 
and Tilly have found that there is marked "U-turn" in the pattern of inequality 
(measured by the variance of logs of annual earnings) for full-time year round 
workers, whose earnings can be viewed as w?ge rates, (see figure 3.2) Consistent 
with this, Danzinger and Gottshalk attribute some of the rising poverty among 
children to the increased incidence of low weekly earnings of heads of house-
holds, which suggests a role for increased earnings inequality here also. By 
contrast, using May CPS data on usual weekly earnings, Medoff finds no change in 
inequality beyond what might be expected on the basis of the business cycle. 
(2) That it is due to increased inequality in the structure of unemployment 
or joblessness. Baily has pointed out that the dispersion of unemployment rates 
by demographic group and region(figure3.3)(but not industry or occupation) has 
tended to widen. Table 14 shows the pattern of change in unemployment and 
joblessness rates for groups, which is in concord with his claim. It shows 
higher rates of unemployment for black youths, women who maintain families, 
and for persons unemployed for long periods of time compared to the overall 
unemployment rate, with the recovery of 1983-85 leaving these groups with 
higher rates of unemployment than in 1980 when the aggregate rate was roughly 
on the 
(3) The other two factors that are likely to have affected income distribu-
tion in the period under study are changes in welfare income, notably AFOC 
payments, whose value fell by 30+ percent in real terms from the early 1970s to 
the early 1980s. Problems with reporting of welfare and other transfer payments 
on the standard CPS survey make it difficult to determine the extent which 
filling AFDC benefits have caused greater income inequality and poverty. 
(4) Changes in family composition, notably the rise of single person fami-
lies and increased number of female-headed homes, especially among blacks. 
Bloom and Blackburn, in particular, have examined this factor in detail and 
attribute the bulk of changes in the income distribution to the rise of 
female-headed households. Danziger and Gottshalk's recent analysis shows how 
the rise in the female-headed household had contributed to rising poverty 
among families with children; in their data, roughly half of the rise in 
poverty is due to this factor (see table -5) 
3.2 DeindustriaJLizrttion and Structure ot Jobs 
That the share of the work force in the U.S. in manufacturing has fallen 
partcularly sharply in recent years is undeniable. The debate over 
deindustrialization, however, involves a broader set of issues. First, does 
one want to use the share of the work force in manufacturing as an indicator 
of an economic problem? Part of the decline in the manufacturing share of 
employment is due simply to greater growth of productivity in manufacturing 
than in services and in consequent differential price changes and elasticities 
of demand for products. Lawrence has insightfully pointed out that the share 
of constant dollar GNP originating from manufacturing has been relatively 
constant in the U.S. (table 3.6) In addition, comparisons of changes in manufac-
turing's share of employment in the U.S. and in other developed countries show 
that the U.S. has not had an exceptional decline in manufacturing employment 
relatively, and given overall expansion of U.S. employment, certainly not in 
terms of absolute numbers. Finally, wachter & Linneman find that outside the 
union sector, there has been almost no decline in manufacturing's share of 
employment in the U.S. 
The issue of manufacturing's share of employment and deindustrialization 
can, however, be put into a broader context. From the point of view of the 
labor market, the issue is not what is happening to manufacturing per se but 
rather what the changing composition of the economy and labor demand is doing to 
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FIGURE 3 . 3 T h · Dispersion of Unemployment R a t · · by Demographic Group 
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Table 3.4 Unemployment Rates, by Group 
1. Adult Hales 
2. Black 
V 
3. Black Hales, 16-19 
4. Women who 
Haintain Families 5.4 9.2 10.3 10.4 
5. Unemployed 27 
Weeks and Over 0.3 0.8 1.4 1.1 
1970 
3.5 
8.6a 
1971) 
31.7 
1980 
5.9 
14.3 
37.5 
1984 
6.6 
15.9 
42.7 
1985 
6.2 
13.7 
41.0 
Source: Economic Report of the President, 1986. 
a «y estimate from black and other. 
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Table 3.5: Th* Composition of Fanille» with Children, by Nuaixr of Parent· 
and Sex of Mead, and the Number of Families, 1967-1984 
A l l fami l ies with Children 
Τι,ο parenta 
S l c f l a parant, amie 
S Inf i« parant, female 
Number («Ul lon«) 
Uhi ta Familles with Children 
Τνο parante 
Slnf l« perent, mele 
SInfla parent, female 
Number (mil l ions) 
Black Familles with Children 
Tuo parents 
Singla parent, male 
S l n f l · parent, female 
Number (mil l ions) 
Hispanic Families with Children 
Two parenta 
S l n f l · parent, male 
S l n f l · parent, female 
lumber (mil l ion· ) 
1967 1973 1979 1984 
Notai Because white, black, and Híspanles are not mutually exclusive 
cataforles , the number of a l l families with children does not 
•qual the aun of the three group« shown. See footnote 2 in tax t 
for d e t a i l s . 
Source: Danziger and Gottschalk. 
88. IX 
1.3 
10.4 
100.0 
29.0 
90.9 
1.3 
7.8 
100.0 
25.5 
66.1 
3 .1 
30.8 
100.0 
3 .2 
u .a . 
n .a . 
n .a . 
n . a . 
n .a . 
83.6% 
1.8 
14.6 
100.0 
31 .1 
87 .4 
1.6 
11 .0 
100.0 
26 .8 
57 .3 
3 .0 
39 .7 
100.0 
3 .8 
78 .1 
2 .1 
19.8 
100.0 
1.8 
78 .41 
2 .5 
19.1 
100.0 
32 .2 
83 .0 
2 .3 
14.7 
100.0 
27 .3 
48 .3 
3 .8 
47 .9 
100.0 
4 . 3 
75 .3 
2 .8 
21 .9 
100.0 
2 . 3 
75.3X 
3.4 
21 .3 
'Í00.0 
33 .3 
80 .2 
3 . 3 
16.5 
100.0 
27.7 
44 .1 
4 .1 
51.8 
100.0 
4 .6 
70.5 
4 . 0 
25 .5 
100.0 
2 .8 
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Tabie 3.6: Manufacturing Share of Output and Employment, 1980-84 
Share of Share of Share of 
nonagricu.1 fu ra i Current $ Constant Í M i l l i ons of 
&HP 6NP Employees 
I960 
1970 
198Û 
1984 
Source,: Economic Report of the P r e s i d e n t 1986 
3 3 . 7 
2 7 . 3 
2 2 . 4 
1 9 . 9 
2 9 . 1 
2 4 . 8 
2 1 . 2 
2 0 . 1 
2 1 . 4 
2 1 . 0 
2 0 . 9 
2 1 . 8 
15 .2 
19 .4 
2 0 . 3 
I S . 4 
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the quality of jobs. Are the jobs lost through change better or worse than 
those created in growing sectors? 
On the side of those worried about de industrialization, the industrial 
structure of the U.S. is definitely shifting toward lower wage and lower produc-
tivity employment. In crudest form, this can be seen in the decline of the 
manufacturing share of employment. More sophisticated analyses which calculate 
share-shift decompositions (as in our equation (1)) show, that the change in 
industry mix reduces average wages only relatively modestly (Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, Gorham), though the effect for some workers with specified charac-
teristics may be quite substantial. Countering the worsened distribution of jobs 
by industry, however, is the continued improvement in the job structure by 
occupation, with employment in professional,managerial, and technical jobs growing 
more rapidly than employment in low-wage occupations (Rosenthal). Finally, within 
industries there is some evidence that, while occupational distributions are 
shifting toward more skilled jobs they are doing so in such a manner as to produce 
a mere bifurcated occupational structure. In an unpublished PhD dissertation 
Patrick Walker has found evidence of such a pattern in most U.S. industries, using 
data on detailed occupational composition. Whether these results will be 
confirmed by earnings or wage data within industries, however, is open to 
question. 
A major difficulty in interpreting the changes in job structure in the U.S. 
is a general failure by analysts to investigate the causes of the changes. If 
the growth of low-wage service sector jobs reflects the rise of the female work 
force, and increased number of young workers into the job market, one would be 
less concerned than if it represents changes in demand and technology with long 
term consequences for the job and income distribution of primary (male and 
female) workers as opposed to secondary workers. Similarly, one would be less 
concerned than the relative decline of manufacturing employment in the U.S. if 
it is due to presumably short-term overvaluation of the dollar, rather than 
longterm structural change; or if the service sector will be "creating" better 
jobs in the future. 
Just as one must examine the supply and demand factors that influence wages 
to evaluate what wages do to employment, so too must one examine the supply and 
demand determinants of changes in the job structure (the "flexibility" of the 
job structure?) to determine if those changes are desireable or not. 
3.3 Troubled Groups 
It is common to distinguish between two groups of workers having job market 
problems: displaced workers defined as those who lost relatively high-wage and 
desirable jobs; and disadvantaged workers, whose position in the market never 
gave them high earnings or employment stability-- and concluded that only the 
latter faced significant problems. 
Evidence on displaced labor in the 1980s shows (Flaim and Sehgal; Podgursky 
and Swain) : 
(1) A rather large proportion of displaced workers remaining unemployed 
long after their displacement, with nearly six months of joblessness on average 
and with nearly 30 percent of blue-collar workers and 20 percent of white-collar 
and service workers having spells of joblessness over a year. 
(2) loss of health insurance during joblessness for large numbers. 
(3) sizeable losses of wages, particularly for those from the durable 
manufacturing sector, where workers suffered a 21% drop in wages between 
loss of job and receipt of new job. 
While absence of a survey comparable to the recent BLS survey makes it 
difficult to reach a firm conclusion, the situation faced by displaced workers 
seems to be worse than previously. Even so, however, most analysts would agree 
that the economic problems faced by the disadvantaged -- minority youth, female 
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heads of households— continue to be more severe. Whereas some displaced 
workers do very poorly, the proportions with very low incomes is far below the 
proportions of "disadvantaged workers." 

4 ì 
IV Summary of Findings 
This review of evidence on the performance of the decentralized U.S. labor 
market in the 1970s-1980s has revealed several aspects of the U.S. system of 
wage and employment determination. 
(1) The U.S. wage system is relatively flexible across groups of workers 
and has generated sluggish nominal and real wage growth in a period of time 
when such growth seems to be a reasonable response to macro economic 
conditions, namely the oil shock and sluggish overall economic growth. 
(2) However, because of a divergence between the CPI and WPI indexes, 
wages deflated by product prices actually rose substantially in the 1980s while 
those deflated by consumer prices did not, creating doubts about the contribu-
tion of sluggish real wages to the growth of employment in that period. 
(3) The fringe benefit share of U.S. pay has continued to rise, with 
however some indication of a levelling off at least among large firms. 
(4) Employment costs in the U.S. have fallen relative to the cost of 
energy but not relative to the cost of capiti!, and appear to have behaved no 
better than relative factor costs elsewhere. 
(5) Because the slow growth of wage in the U.S had been accompanied by 
slow productivity growth, unit labor costs did not improve compared to other 
countries. Moreover, fluctuations in the value of the dollar have been more 
important in the U.S competitive position than wage developments. 
(6) Wage differentials have risen for union workers, large establishment 
workers and workers in high-wage industry in what seems to be noncompetitive 
ways that are deleterious to employment. In each of these cases rising 
(declining) relative wages were associated with declining (rising) relative 
employment. 
(7) Wage differentials have changed by age, and education and occupation 
in ways potentially contributing to employment. In each of these cases, when 
relative wages went down, relative employment grew. 
(8) Relative wages have risen for minorities and women with little 
apparent impact on employment; however wages of blacks may have fallen 
relative to whites in the 1980s. 
(9) The sizeable growth of employment in the U.S compared to Europe has 
not been accompanied by a superior growth of GDP. It is, by contrast, linked to 
sluggish productivity growth. 
(10) Income inequality and poverty have risen sharply, especially for 
families with children, though the extent to which this is due to changes in 
wage structure and other labor market factors is not established. By contrast 
evidence regarding the declining middle is mixed, with family income data 
showing a decline and weekly earnings showing no such pattern. 
(11) Inequality of joblessness has risen along demographic and geographic 
lines with black youths, and women who maintain families doing particularly 
poorly. 
(12) Deindustrialization, defined as a relative decline in employment or 
manufacturing, is less in the U.S. than elsewhere. Measured as a share of 
constant dollar GDP manufacturing did not become smaller in the economy through 
the 1980s. 
(13) Displaced workers appear to have had greater problems in the job 
market in the 1980s than in earlier decades, but are still, on average, better 
off than disadvantaged workers. 
All in all, the experience of the U.S. labor market has been more diverse 
and complex than is recognized by European analysts who glorify "wage 
flexibility" as an economic cure-all. First, there are questions about the 
overall contribution of wage flexibility to the employment success of the U.S. 
Wnile one can cite the decline in youth relative to adult wages as a strong 
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case-in-point for flexible wages creating jobs, there are other instances of 
changes in relative wages which did not have such obvious positive employment 
effects. Second, the decentralized U.S. system may have produced greater 
inequality than another wage-determining system. If sluggish real wage growth 
did greatly enhance employment, which is questionable, it did so at the expense 
of real living standards and increased poverty. Like everything else in econo-
mics, a decentralized labor market has negatives as well as positives. 
Footnotes 
1. OECD, Employment Outlook, September 1985 back cover. 
2. See B. Bluestone and B. Harrison; L. Thurow. 
3. See R. Freeman in M. Feldstein "Evolution of the American Labor Market 
1948-80", The American Economy in Transition, (University of Chicago, 
1982) for changes over the long run. 
4· It is important to recognize that not all data sets show the increased ine-
quality in wages. Data from May Current Population Surveys show little 
change in inequality across industries. 
5. See R. Freeman, "In Search of Union Wage Concessions in Standard Data Sets," 
Industrial Relations, 1986. 
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